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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a matching model to study the efficiency of thin and thick markets. Our
model shows that the probabilities of matches in a thin market are significantly lower than those in
a thick market. When applying our results to a job search model, it implies that, if the ratio of job
candidates to job openings remains (roughly) a constant, the probability that a person can find a job
is higher in a thick market than in a thin market. We apply our matching model to the U.S. academic
market  for  new  PhD  economists.  Consistent  with  the  prediction  of  our  model,  a  field  of
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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a matching model to study the eciency of thin and thick markets.
Our model shows that the probabilities of matches in a thin market are signicantly lower than
those in a thick market. When applying our results to a job search model, it implies that, if
the ratio of job candidates to job openings remains (roughly) a constant, the probability that a
person can nd a job is higher in a thick market than in a thin market. We apply our matching
model to the U.S. academic market for new PhD economists. Consistent with the prediction of
our model, a eld of specialization with more job openings and more candidates has a higher
probability of matching.
Key words: thin and thick market, matching function, market eciency, empirical test.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we are interested in the following question: Compare two markets, one of which has
5 vacancies and 5 applicants, and the other of which has 50 vacancies and 50 candidates. Which
market has a lower unemployment rate? The market with a lower unemployment rate is said to be
more ecient than the one with a higher unemployment rate.
To answer this question, we set up the following model. We let vacancies have dierent minimum
standards, and job candidates have dierent productivities. A rm is willing to hire any candidate
with a productivity that is higher than its minimum standard, but prefers the candidate with a
higher productivity than one with a lower one. A candidate will accept any oer but prefers the rm
with a higher minimum standard. Further, we allow the minimum standards and productivities to
be randomly drawn from a common distribution, and thereupon to become public information.
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1For such a market, we prove: (1) The matching probability does not depend on the underlying
distribution. (2) When the number of rms and the number of candidates increase, we have a lower
unemployment rate (higher matching probability) in the market. For example, when both the
number of candidates and of openings are 5, the matching probability is .694. When the number
of candidates and openings are 50, the matching probability is .885. (3) The variance of matching
probabilities decreases as the market becomes thicker. (4) The conclusion that a thicker market has
a larger matching probability than a thinner market continues to hold for the following three more
general cases: rst, the number of vacancies does not equal the number of candidates; second, the
minimum requirement for a vacancy and the productivity of a candidate are random draws from
dierent distributions; and nally, the vacancies and candidates arrive at the market sequentially.
To empirically test our model, we collect information on the U.S. academic market for new PhD
economists. We collect the American academic job openings listed for each eld in the September,
October, November and December issues of Job Openings for Economists (JOE), in both 1999 and
2000. We then nd out how many of these openings are lled. The ratio of the total number of lled
jobs divided by the average openings in each eld is the measure of the probability of job matching.
In addition, we collect job candidate information from the top 50 departments of economics in U.S.
universities.
The empirical estimates strongly support our theoretical hypothesis: a thicker market does have
a higher matching probability than a thinner market. In particular, according to the empirical
estimate, when the number of candidates and openings are 5, the matching probability is .361.
When the number of candidates is 50, the matching probability is .523. Our matching model can
also explain the empirical nding of Niederle and Roth (2003) in which a thicker market (through
a centralized clearinghouse) increases the matching probability and mobility of gastroenterologists.
Previous literature often uses changes in vacancy rates and in unemployment rates and/or dura-
tion to empirically estimate some matching functions.1 Using the market data for PhD economists
oers several advantages over regular job markets. First, there is less of an information problem
in this market in the sense that each institute receives applications from almost all potentially
qualied job candidates, and almost all job openings are well known to all candidates, as they are
published in a single magazine JOE. Second, there is a reasonable consensus in terms of the ranking
1See, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Berman (1997).
2of a job, i.e., a job in a better-ranked department is considered by most to be a better job. Third,
there is some consensus in terms of the ranking of candidates, although signicant heterogeneity
still exists.
Although intuitively a thick market has a larger probability of matching, there is no consensus
in the literature regarding this intuition. For example, a thicker market has an adverse eect
in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), has no eect in Lagos (2000), and has a positive eect in
Coles and Smith (1998). The dierent conclusions of these papers result from dierent matching
technology. In Diamond (1982) and Howitt and McAfee (1987), the thickness of a market has
externality on itself. If buyers expect that fewer sellers exist in the market, the expected higher
cost of transaction discourages buyers from entering into the market. When the same conditions
are applied to sellers, low economic activities are expected. Howitt and McAfee (1988) show that it
is possible to have multiple externalities (one positive and one negative). These discussions assume
that the transaction cost is higher or the probability of matching is smaller in a thinner market.
This assumption is intuitively appealing but was neither formally modeled nor empirically veried.
The eect of \thickness" in the market has been studied extensively in the microstructure
literature in nance under the term \liquidity." For example, in Lippman and McCall (1986), a
thicker market indicates that more transactions of a homogeneous good take place in a unit of time.
In their paper, liquidity is dened in terms of the time elapsed between transactions. This length of
time is a function of a number of factors, including the frequency of oers and the ﬂexibility of prices,
among others. In an empirical study on common factors that aect liquidity, Chordia, Roll and
Subrahmanyam (2000) use ve liquidity measures including the dierence in prices oered by buyers
and sellers, and in quantities oered by buyers and sellers in a period of time. In their approach,
the smaller the dierence between the prices and the larger the quantities oered by the buyers and
sellers of a homogeneous good (an equity), the more liquid a market is. One distinguishing feature
in nancial markets is that buyers and sellers often arise endogenously. If prices are low, potential
sellers easily become buyers. In the labor market, it is hard for workers to become employers or
vice versa. Therefore, the pool of employers and employees is often exogenously determined.
Since our model relates the matching probability with the thickness of the market, it can provide
a matching function with a microfoundation. The importance of the matching function has been
discussed in a recent survey paper by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). They claim that both
3the matching function and the demand-for-money function are as important as the production
function as a tool kit for macroeconomists. However, most of the existing matching functions lack
well-received microfoundation as stated in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p.425) \Currently, the
most popular functional form, Cobb-Douglas with constant return to scale, is driven by its empirical
success and lacks microfoundations. The most popular microeconomic models, such as the urn-
ball game, do not perform well empirically." In this paper, we provide a matching function with
microfoundations and show that our matching function performs reasonably well for the empirical
data we collected.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our matching model and the basic
implications of the model. Section 3 presents our empirical test of the model using the data
collected from the U.S. academic job market for new PhD economists. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The matching mechanism
Let u be a measure of the productivity of a job candidate. Let a rm's prot function be:
(u;v)=m a x f0;u− vg; (1)
where v indicates the type of the rm. In this simple model, the rm will hire a candidate if u>v ,
and it prefers a candidate with a higher productivity than one with a lower productivity. The
variable v can be thought of as the rm's minimum quality requirement.
Without loss of generality we assume that v takes value in [0;C]f o rs o m eC>0. We assume a
candidate's utility function is:
w(u;v)=m a x f0;vg: (2)
The candidate will accept all job oers as long as v  0 but prefers the rm with higher v than
one with a lower v.
The matching technology between rms and job candidates dened in (1) and (2) is similar to
matching medical interns and residents with hospitals described in Roth (1984). Our primary goal
is to examine how the matching probability varies with the number of job candidates and number
4of job openings. We consider the problem of V rms and U job applicants, and each rm has one
opening. Let the rms' minimum requirement be v1;;v V , and job candidates' productivity be
u1;;u U. We assume that all productivities and minimum requirements are randomly drawn from
a common continuous distribution F() so that no productivity is exactly the same with probability
1 as any minimum requirement. All ui
0s by all candidates and all rms' minimum requirement vj
0s
are assumed to be known after they are drawn.
According to our model described by (1) and (2), an applicant i may be hired by rm j only
if the productivity of the applicant ui is higher than the minimum requirement of the rm vj.
If more than one applicant has a higher productivity than the minimum requirement vj, r m
j hires the candidate with the highest productivity. Similarly, if more than one rm has lower
minimum requirements than applicant i productivity ui, the applicant prefers the rm with the
highest minimum requirement. After a match occurs, both the rm and the applicant are out of
the market. The process continues until no candidate has a higher productivity than any of the
remaining rms' minimum requirements.
In the academic market, a better department is preferred by all newly minted PhDs. The
constraint in the market is that each institute has a minimum quality requirement and a better
institute has a higher minimum quality requirement. Each institute prefers the candidate with the
highest quality that satises their minimum requirement. In this case, a necessary condition for a
trade to occur between candidate i and institute j is ui >v j.
In this matching mechanism, the job applicant who has the highest productivity matches with
the rm with the highest minimum requirement, provided that this highest ranked candidate meets
the minimum requirement of the rm. Otherwise, the rm leaves the market without lling its
vacancy. However, the applicant who does not match with the rm with the highest minimum
requirement has additional chances to match with other rms. This matching process repeats in
the remaining pool of the applicants and rms.
An alternative way to describe our matching technology is as follows. First we sort all the
randomly drawn productivities and minimum requirements. Then a job candidate with the highest
productivity matches with the rm with the highest minimum requirement, as long as the minimum
requirement is met. Both the job applicant and the rm leave the market. Otherwise, the rm
leaves the market. This process is repeated until no rm's minimum requirements can be met by
5any remaining candidates.
We assume that rm j that has a job opening with quality requirement vj will be willing to
hire any candidate with ui >v j.L e tv(1) <v (2) < ::: < v(V ) and u(1) <u (2) < ::: < u(U) denote
the order statistics obtained from (v1;:::;vV )a n d( u1;:::;uU), respectively. We are interested in the
probability that a randomly chosen candidate can nd a job. Let r be the number of people that
nd jobs, 0  r  n =m i n fV;Ug.L e tP r ( r) denote the probability that exactly r people nd jobs.







In Lemma 1 below, we give the exact probability for a particular order statistic. This lemma
is useful for us to obtain matching probabilities.
Lemma 1: Let u(1) <u (2) < ::: < u(U) be the order statistic obtained from i.i.d. data
u1;:::;uU,a n dv(1) <v (2) < ::: < v(V ) be the order statistic obtained from i.i.d data v1;:::;vV . ui
and vj have the common distribution F(_ )w i t hp d ff(). Let z(1) <z (2) < ::: < z(U+V ) denote
the order statistic obtained from (u(1);:::;u(U);v (1);:::;v(V )). There are (U + V )!=[(V !)(U!)] such
orderings. Let Zn denote the random variable (z(1);:::;z(U+V )). Then for any one particular order
z,w eh a v e
Pr(Zn = z)=
(V !)(U!)
(U + V )!
: (4)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in A.1. In Lemma 1, the probability of any particular order
statistic z does not depend on the underlying distribution of candidates and openings. Since the
overall matching probability involves accounting the number of appropriate orderings, it does not
depend on underlying distributions. In the following sections, we apply Lemma 1 to study how the
matching probabilities vary with the number of vacancies and the number of candidates. We rst
discuss the case where the number of vacancies and the number of candidates are the same, and
then we proceed with the case where they are dierent.
2.2 When the number of openings equals the number of candidates
Our primary interest in this paper is to study how the matching probability changes when the
number of openings and the number of candidates change. Our discussion starts with the case
where the number of applicants is the same as the number of openings. Let n = V = U,a n dw e
6write Mn;n = Mn. W ed e n o t eb yAn the probability that a randomly selected person can nd a










We investigate below how An changes as n changes. We build our model from the simplest case
where there is one vacancy and one job applicant.
T h ec a s eo fn =1 :















In the case of one applicant and one job opening, given that both u and v are randomly drawn
from the same distribution, the probability that one random draw is larger than the other is 1/2.
T h ec a s eo fn =2 :
Let (u1;u 2) be random draws of the two candidates' productivities, and let (v1;v 2) be random
draws of the minimum requirements of two job openings. All are from the same distribution. Let
u(1) <u (2) be the order statistic of (u1;u 2)a n dv(1) <v (2) be the order statistic of (v1;v 2). Using
Lemma 1 we have:
Pr(0) = Pr(u(1) <u (2) <v (1) <v (2))=( 2 ! ) 2(1=4!) = 1=6:
Pr(2) = Pr(u(2) >v (2);u (1) >v (1))
=P r ( u(2) >v (2) >u (1) >v (1))+P r ( u(2) >u (1) >v (2) >v (1))
=2 f(2!)2(1=4!)g =1 =3:







rPr(r)=[ ( 1 =2) + 2(1=3)]=2=7 =12:
We observe that A2 =7 =12 > 1=2=A1. That is, when the market becomes thicker (n
increases from 1 to 2), the probability that each person can nd a job is increased from 1/2 to 7/12.
To understand the intuition of this result, note that since fu1;u 2g and fv1;v 2g are from the same
7Table 1: Matching Probabilities Based on 100,000 Simulations if (V = U)
(Openings and Candidates Have the Same Distributions)
n 123456789 1 0
An .5003 .5835 .6337 .6682 .6940 .7135 .7288 .7448 .7562 .7665
Std of An .5000 .3434 .2765 .2379 .2116 .1932 .1786 .1661 .1561 .1481
n 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1000
An .8258 8543 .8720 .8845 .8938 .9013 .9074 .9124 .9163 .9725
Std of An .1041 .0853 .0734 .0657 .0599 .0554 .0523 .0494 .0459 .0144
distribution, the order statistics also have the distribution: Fu(1)()=Fv(1)()a n dFu(2)()=Fv(2)().
Given this, we have:
Pr(u(1) >v (1))=1 =2; and Pr(u(2) >v (2))=1 =2: (5)
If (5) were the only cases that candidates and openings match, we would still end up with
a matching probability of 1/2. However, an additional chance exists even when u(1) <v (1) and
u(2) <v (2) since it is still possible to have u(2) >v (1). This additional chance of matching is the
source of the eect of a thicker market.
In A.3 and A.4, we calculate the matching probabilities for n =3a n dn = 4. Although the
same approach can be applied to compute An for any n>4, the burden of computation becomes
tedious as n increases. A simple alternative is to use simulations to numerically compute An.L e t
An;j be the estimated value of An based on the jth simulation draw of (u1;:::;un)a n d( v1;:::;vn),
i.e., An;j equals the number of people nding jobs in the jth random draw. We estimate An by
 An: = J−1 PJ
j=1 An;j. Provided that J is suciently large, we can obtain an estimated value of An
with any desired accuracy. We use J = 100;000 in our simulation. We also compute the sample
standard error of fAn;jgn
j=1 by [(J − 1)−1 PJ
j=1(An;j −  An:)2]1=2. The results are given in Table 1.
We have already shown that A1 =0 :5, A2 =7 =12  0:5833. In the Appendix we also compute
the exact values of An for n =3 ;4; they are A3 =1 9 =30  0:6333 and A4 = 187=280  0:6679.
Comparing these results with the simulation results of Table 1, we see that the simulation results
dier from the theoretical results only in the fourth decimal.
8From Table 1 we observe that An increases as n increases, while the standard error decreases
as n increases. The monotonically increasing relationship between matching probabilities and the
thickness of the market can also be clearly seen in Figure 1. The solid line in Figure 1 illustrates the
matching probabilities as a function of the number of candidates. As n !1 , both the candidates
and openings become dense in the support of f(). Therefore, the probability of matching is
expected to converge to one as n !1 . This is indeed the case as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 2: The employment rate An converges to one as n !1 .
The proof of lemma 2 is given in the appendix. Note that lemma 2 does not mean that as n !1 ,
every individual will nd a match. In fact the total unemployed, calculated by n(1−An), also goes
up as n increases. For example, when n= 10, 100 and 1000, the average numbers of unemployed
workers are roughly 2, 8, and 30, respectively. It is 1 − An,t h epercentage of unemployed (the
unemployment rate) that goes down as n increases.
Our theoretical analysis and simulation results show that: (1) A thicker market provides a
larger chance of matching; (2) The probability of matching varies less in a thicker market than in
a thinner market.
Previous results are obtained by assuming that the job requirements and candidates' produc-
tivities have the same distribution. Next, we brieﬂy discuss the case that they have dierent
distributions. We show that in this case the matching probability will depend on the specic
distribution functions, but a thicker market still has a larger probability of matching.
We consider the simple case where candidates are randomly drawn from uniform[0,1], and the
openings are randomly drawn from uniform [;1+], 0    1. We will only consider the case of




(1 − )2; and A2 =
7
12
(1 − )2 +
1
12
(1 − )2(2 + 3): (6)
Obviously, A2 >A 1 for all  2 [0;1]. A thicker market still has a larger probability of matching.
For n>2, the computation becomes quite tedious. However, one can use simulations to compute
An easily for any value of n. Figure 2 illustrates how the simulated matching probabilities vary with
n and with . Two patterns emerge from Figure 2. First, as expected, a larger dierence in means
results in lower matching probabilities. Second, for a xed value of , the matching probabilities
9increase as the market becomes thicker. By exactly the same argument as in the proof of lemma
2, one can show that as n !1 , An ! 1 −  (0 <<1).
Note that when   1, An =0f o ra l ln, because in this case the highest seller's productivity
is lower than the lowest buyer's requirement. However, if the two distributions are N(;2)a n d
N(+;2) (the two means also dier by ), then An > 0 for all values of . This simple example
shows that when the two distributions are dierent, the matching probability will depend on the
specic distributions.
2.3 The number of vacancies is dierent from the number of candidates
In the previous section, we only focus on the case where the number of candidates equals the
number of openings. In a real market, it is unlikely that there will be exactly the same number
of candidates and openings. In this section, we consider cases where the number of candidates is
dierent from the number of openings. They are still random draws from a common distribution.
Let U be the number of candidates and V be the number of openings. The number of people





We summarize some properties of matching functions below.
(i)MU;V = MV;U is symmetric in V and U, (ii) MU;V increases as either V or U increases, (iii)
If both V and U increase with V=U = a, a xed positive constant, then BU;V = MU;V =V increase
as V (U = V=a)i n c r e a s e s .
(i) follows from a simple symmetry argument. (ii) is true because adding more candidates
or openings to a market obviously cannot reduce the number of matching; in fact, there is a
positive probability of increasing the number of matching, thus the average matching of MU;V
will be larger (for any nite values of V and U). (iii) is the most interesting result: it says
that when the market becomes thicker, the probability of matching success increases for both
candidates and openings. The intuition behind (iii) is quite simple. We have already seen that
this is true for the case of V = U = n. In Appendix A.6 we show how to compute MU;V (or
BU;V ) for the general (U;V ) case. For example, for (U;V )=( 1 ;2) (or (2;1)), MU;V =2 =3;
for (U;V )=( 1 ;3), MU;V =3 =4; and for (U;V )=( 2 ;4), MU;V =2 3 =15. First we note that
10B1;2 =2 =3 <B 2;4 =( 1 =2)(23=15) = 23=30, so that as the number of V and U doubles (the market
becomes thicker), the matching probability increases. Next we compare the case of (U;V )=( 1 ;3)
and (2;2), where we have M2;2 =7 =6 > 3=4=M1;3.W i t ht h esame total number of openings and
candidates, the closer the ratio of V=U is to 1, the higher the averaging number of people that can
nd jobs.
Again, a simple alternative is to use simulations to estimate MU;V (BU;V ). We will use the
simulation method to help us evaluate some of our proposed matching functions in the next section.
2.4 A matching function
Because our model relates the matching probability with the thickness of the market, it can provide
a matching function with a microfoundation. A series of matching functions has already been
introduced in the literature; here we brieﬂy discuss some of the existing matching functions and
compare them with our matching function.
In a typical matching model with constant return to scale, the thickness of the market does not
enter the matching probability. The relationship between the number of people who are looking for
jobs and the number of people who nd jobs is dierent from our claim that market thickness has
a positive eect on the job matching ratio. For example, consider a typical matching model with
constant return to scale,







where m(U;V ) is the matching function, M is the number of people who nd jobs, V and U are
numbers of job openings and job searchers. The second equality of the previous equation is due to











where BU;V is rms' matching probability. If the ratio of candidates to vacancies is xed, so is
the matching probability M=V. A particular form of constant return to scale function is M=V =
1 − exp(−aU=V ), which is used in Blanchard and Diamond (1994) where a is the intensity of the
search. Other interesting works related to our matching model include Burdett et al. (2001) and
the stock-ﬂow matching of Coles and Smith (1998).
11It would be ideal if one could derive an explicit functional form to relate matching probabilities
with the thickness of the market. While this goal may be quite dicult to accomplish, we are able to
propose a parsimonious approximate matching function which satises some basic properties of the
theoretical matching function. We will show that this approximate matching function can t the
theoretical matching probabilities very well. We are interested in obtaining a probability matching
function, say BU;V = MU;V =V . However, it is easier to impose restrictions on the matching function
MU;V . We rst list some of the properties that MU;V should preserve.
(i) MU;V is symmetric on (U;V ).
(ii) For any nite values of (U;V ), MU;V < minfU;V g,a n dMU;V is an increasing function in U
(V ) for a xed value of V (U).
(iii) Let d =
p
U2 + V 2 denote the distance of (U;V ) to the origin. For (U;V ) 2 R2
+ with d = c,
a constant, MU;V is monotonically decreasing as d (U;V ) moves away from the middle point
of V = U (along the arc of d = c).
The following simple matching function satises the above four conditions:
M
(0)






V 2 + U2,a n d0; 1,a n d2 are parameters (1 is positive and 2 is negative).
It is obvious that M
(0)
U;V in (9) satises properties (i) and (ii) above. To see that it also satises
(iii), note that when d = c is a constant, M
(0)
U;V = 1 minfU;V gjd=c + 2=c, which decreases
monotonically as (U;V ) moves away from the middle point of U = V (along the arc of d = c).















If we replace 2=(Vd )b y2=d (removing the 1=V factor) in (10) we obtain the following















12Table 2: Regressions of Matching Probabilities
1  U;V  10
Models Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)
constant .015 (.841) .075 (4.28) .060 (1.96)
minfU=V;1g .805 (37.7) .787 (42.8) .779 (42.3)
1=(U2 + V 2)1=2 -.423 (-7.07) -.456 (-4.55)
1=[V (U2 + V 2)1=2] -.281 (-3.20)
3 1.19 (3.05)
R2 .937 .951 .957
Number of observations 100 100 100
* t-values are in parentheses.
Interestingly we observe that (11) performs better that model (10) using both theoretical (sim-
ulated) matching probabilities and the empirical data.














When 3 = 1, (12) reduces back to (11). Because model (12) is nonlinear in parameters, one
needs some iterative procedure such as a nonlinear least squares method to estimate model (12).
To examine how well our proposed matching functions approximate the theoretical (simulated)
matching function, we carry out a least squares regression, using (simulated) theoretical values
of BU;V = MU;V =V as the dependent variable, and estimate models (10), (11), and (12). The
regression results for models in (10) to (12) are reported in Table 2.
As can be seen in Table 2, our specications can explain the (simulated) theoretical matching
probability well, with R2 being at least :937. The R2 is .951 for model (11) and .957 for model (12).
The results show that all of the proposed models t the theoretical model very well. However, this
does not imply that one should expect that all of them should t empirical data equally well. As
we will see shortly, model (12) provides the best t for the empirical data we collected.
132.5 A sequential matching mechanism
Up to now we have only considered a static model where all candidates and openings arrive at the
market simultaneously. In this section we brieﬂy discuss the case of a sequential matching model.
Our approach follows closely that of Coles and Smith (1998) who capture a realistic feature of
market search, that if a job seeker cannot match with the exiting pool of vacancies, he/she will
wait for the arrivals of new job vacancies. We consider two extreme cases: (i) All matched pairs
can break up an earlier match and re-match in a later period without a cost. The time discount
rate is zero. (ii) Both the re-match cost and the time discount rate are innite.
A zero re-matching cost and a zero time discount rate
It is easy to see that in this case the results of sections 2.2 and 2.3 remain valid without changes.
Suppose at period t,w eh a v eac u m u l a t i v eo fUt job candidates, and a cumulative of Vt vacancies,
the number of matches will be exactly the same as in the static case with a total number of Ut
candidates and Vt vacancies. This is because all matched pairs can freely break up with earlier
matches and to nd the best match available to them. The highest quality individual will match
with the best job available provided her quality meets the minimum requirement of that job. The
second highest quality individual will match with the next best available job. Consequently, the
matching results will be identical as in the static case with the same total numbers of candidates
and vacancies.
An innite re-matching cost and an innite time discount rate
When both the cost of re-entering the market and the time discount rate are innite, all rms
and individuals will try to nd a match as soon as possible, and when a match is found, the matched
pair will exit the market. Although these assumptions are not realistic, they serve as a benchmark
case and from which we can deduct useful information on the more realistic nite re-matching
cost/discount factor cases.
We will only consider the case where the number of candidates equals the number of openings.
This will be the case if candidates and openings arrive at the market in pairs so that the total
numbers of candidates and openings equal each other at all times. We assume that dierent pairs
arrive at the market sequentially. If the rst pair of candidate and opening matches with each
other, they will sign a contract and exit the market. If not, they become stock and wait for
14matching opportunities among future arrivals. When a pair (a candidate and an opening) arrives
at the market, the two can match with each other or match with the existing stock, according to
whichever gives the higher utility. If no match is found, they become stock.
Let n = V = U denote the total number of openings and candidates. We use  P(r)t od e n o t e
the probability that exactly r people nd jobs, and use  An = n−1 Pn
r=0 r  P(r) to denote the mean
value of r (the bar notation is used to emphasize a sequential matching process).
T h ec a s eo fV = U =1 .
In this case we have  P[U>V]=1 =2 as before, which gives  A1 =  P(1) = 1=2.
T h ec a s eo fV = U =2 .
Let uj (vj)bet h ejth arrival of candidates(openings), j =1 ;2. Because candidates and openings
arrive sequentially, we cannot use the order statistics to compute  P(r). However, the result obtained
earlier can help calculate the matching probabilities.
The total number of dierent rankings of u1, u2, v1 and v2 is 4! = 24 (four times that of the order
statistic case). We can use the calculation of Pr(r)t oh e l pu st oo b t a i n  P(r). For example, in the
market of simultaneous arrival, the order statistic that no one nds a job is: u(1) <u (2) <v (1) <v (2),
and the probability is Pr(0) = 1=6. In the market of sequential arrival, there are four cases that
no one nds a job: (i) u1 <u 2 <v 1 <v 2, (ii) u2 <u 1 <v 1 <v 2, (iii) u1 <u 2 <v 2 <v 1,a n d( i v )
u2 <u 1 <v 2 <v 1, giving  P(0) = 4=24 = 1=6. So the probability that no one nds a job remains
unchanged.
There is only one case that results in dierent matching probabilities between a sequential
market and a simultaneous market. In the case of v1 <u 2 <v 2 <u 1, u1 will match with v1
a n dt h e n( u1;v 1) exit the market. In the second period, v2 and u2 arrive at the market but they
cannot match because u2 <v 2. If the two pairs had arrived simultaneously, there would be two
matched pairs, u1 with v2,a n du2 with v2. So we see that when arrivals are sequential, the matching
probability decreases and the market becomes less ecient. Using (4) we obtain:
 P(0) = 4=24 = 1=6( =4 =24 as in the simultaneous arrival case)
 P(1) = (12 + 1)=24 = 13=24 (it was 12=24 = 1=2 in the simultaneous arrival case)
 P(2) = (8 − 1)=24 = 7=24 (it was 8=24 = 1=3 in the simultaneous arrival case)
Thus,  A2 =( 1 =2)
P2
r=0 r  P(r)=[ ( 1 3 =24) + 2(7=24)]=2=2 7 =48 > 1=2=  A1.
15We still observe that as the total number of candidates and openings goes up, the average
matching probability increases. However,  A2 =2 7 =48 < 28=48 = A2, the market of sequential
arrival is less ecient compared to the case that all the candidates and openings arrive simultane-
ously, which is an expected result since sequential trading may lead to a very high quality candidate
to match with a vacancy with a very low minimum requirement, resulting in a less ecient market.
Let Pr[(ui;v j)] denote the probability that ui matches vj. Then conditional on u1 <v 1 (so that
u1 and v1 become stock), it is easy to show that Pr[(u2;v 2)] = 1=3 > Pr[(u2;v 1)] = 1=4. Thus,
our matching mechanism implies that u2 has a lower matching probability, or higher rejection rate,
when meeting with v1 (an opening from the stock) than when meeting with v2 (a random draw
from the distribution of job openings). This is because the openings from the stock have a higher
mean value than those drawn from the population. As is easily shown, our model implies that the
rejection rate between a candidate from the ﬂow and an opening from the stock increases as the size
of the stock increases, or equivalently as the averaging matching probability increases (as argued by
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p.406)). This is because the mean of the stock of openings goes
up as its size goes up, resulting in a higher rejection rate for a given pair. Nevertheless, the average
matching probability still goes up since there are more matching opportunities as the market gets
thicker.
Table 3 reports the simulated values of  An for n f r o m1t o1 ;000 (based on 100,000 replications).
Since  A2 =2 7 =48 = :5625, we see again that the simulated value matches the true value in the rst
three decimals.
In Table 3, we observe similar phenomena in the case of simultaneous trading, i.e.,  An increases
(with a decreasing rate) while the standard deviation of  An decreases as n increases. The dashed
line in Figure 1 shows that, as expected, the  An curve is lower than the solid line of the An curve.
A larger friction exists in a market of sequential arrivals.
Even though sequential arrival leads to higher friction, the intuition that a thick market is more
ecient than a thin market remains the same as in the case of a simultaneous arrival. Further it
can be shown that  An ! 1a sn !1 .
So far we consider two extreme case: zero time discount rate and re-match cost vs. innite
time discount rate and re-match cost. Complete discussions of more realistic cases where the time
discount rate and the re-match cost are some nite positive numbers are left for future research.
16Table 3: Matching Probabilities Based on 100,000 Simulations if (V = U)
(Vacancies and Candidates Arrive Sequentially)
n 123456789 1 0
 An .5003 .5622 .5999 .6257 .6452 .6603 .6728 .6833 .6922 .7001
Std of  An .5001 .3330 .2665 .2273 .2034 .1846 .1694 .1575 .1475 .1403
n 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1000
 An .7486 .7736 .7905 .8030 .8127 .8207 .8272 .8332 .8383 .9248
Std of  An .0977 .0812 .0713 .0632 .0582 .0538 .0515 .0486 .0461 .0146
We did not yet consider searching cost in our model. Adding a xed searching cost will not alter
any of the conclusions obtained earlier. A variable searching cost may reduce matching probability.
Given the rapid improvement of internet searching, it seems that a xed search cost is appropriate
for most situations such as economics new Ph.D's market. We leave more detailed discussions on
extensions such as strategic trading behavior and variable searching cost to future research work.
3 Data Collection and an Empirical Test
Empirical study of this issue can be very dicult. It is relatively simple to collect information
about successfully completed transactions in a particular market. However, gathering data about
the participants who failed to complete transactions is often very dicult.
The job market for new PhD economists, therefore, provides an excellent opportunity for exactly
such an empirical study of thin and thick markets' performances. First, we must identify the levels
of supply and demand for this market. The information we require to determine market demand
is available through the journal Job Openings for Economists (JOE). The problem of information
asymmetry is minimal when we consider the job market in economics because JOE provides virtually
complete information sets for the supply of the academic jobs in the U.S. In other labor markets,
we often do not know what specic information sets job applicants can access; but in this case we
do because the journal is widely available to candidates going on the job market. In addition, we
may determine the level of market supply by contacting graduate programs in economics regarding
17their PhDs who have gone on the job market in the past several years.
Our data is organized by eld. The denition of the eld can be found in the \Classication
System of Journal Articles" by the Journal of Economic Literature. In particular, we use the
eld consisting of a capital letter and a numeral. For example, E0 means \Macroeconomics and
Monetary Economics."
We collect the American academic job openings listed in the September, October, November,
and December issues of JOE in 1999 and 2000. In JOE, m job openings are listed with n elds
where m and n are integers. We determine that each eld has average openings of m=n.F o r
example, in 2000, the Department of Economics at the Texas A&M University had ve openings
in nine dierent elds. We assign each eld with 5/9 openings. We sum all the average openings
for all American universities by each eld. We then nd out how many of these openings are lled
by going to each institute's website and/or by contacting relevant people. The ratio of the total
number of lled jobs divided by the average openings in each eld is the measure of the probability
of job matching.
In addition, we collect the job candidate information. We search the links of job candidates
in each of the top-50 departments in the U.S. dened in Dusansky and Vernon (1998). We use
the rst eld listed in each candidate's CV or in the brief introduction of a candidate if no CV is
available.
The summary information of the markets is listed in Table 4. In addition to showing the ten
elds with the most job openings in the table, we include any eld (AF), the mean of the remaining
elds not listed in the table, and the whole market. In both years, AF is by far the largest \eld."
Macroeconomics (E0), Microeconomics (D0), and International Economics (F0) were the top three
elds other than AF in both years. In 1999, the mean of the matching probabilities in the ten elds
with the most job openings is .501, while the mean of the matching probabilities in the remaining
elds is .305. Thicker elds do have larger matching probabilities than thinner elds. The same
pattern repeats in 2000 where the mean of the matching probabilities for the ten elds with the
largest demand is .451, while the rest of the elds have an average matching probability of .268.
We estimate our proposed matching models, given in (10), (11), and (12), using the collected
data. We are primarily interested in the sign of the coecient for the variable of thickness, measured
by the the variable d = (candidates2 + openings2)1=2.
18Table 4: Summary of Academic Markets for New PhD Economists
Fields with average # of lled probability number of
most openings openings positions of matching candidates
Year 2000
Any eld(AF) 95.3 42 .441 0
Macro(E0) 49.3 30 .608 83
Micro(D0) 36.2 18 .498 42
International(F0) 34.9 25 .717 39
Econometrics(C1) 33.5 13 .388 43
Financial Econ(G0) 33.4 19 .568 39
Agric Econ(Q0) 25.6 13 .507 16
Public Econ(H0) 25.4 9 .354 37
General Econ(A1) 22.6 4 .177 0
Health Econ(I1) 21.2 9 .426 11
IO(L0) 19.6 15 .765 60
Mean of remaining elds 2.96 1.40 .305 2.16
Total 617 308 .499 529
Year 2001
Any eld(AF) 125.0 64 .512 0
Macro(E0) 54.8 31 .566 72
International(F0) 39.6 11 .277 29
Micro(D0) 38.2 20 .523 34
Agric Econ(Q0) 37.9 13 .343 11
Econometrics(C1) 36.0 13 .361 32
Health Econ(I1) 34.5 18 .521 14
Financial Econ(G0) 31.9 16 .501 24
Public Econ(H0) 20.7 11 .532 25
IO(L0) 20.7 15 .726 59
General Econ(A1) 18.3 3 .164 0
Mean of remaining elds 3.27 1.20 .268 1.92
Total 696 308 .443 445
19Table 5 gives the estimation results of models (10), (11), and (12), in the same format as that
of Table 2. It is clear that the regressions based on model (12) have the best t, followed by model
(11). In all these dierent specications using dierent sample data, the parameter estimates of 2,
the coecient of the inverse of the thickness variable d, are negative. Moreover, they are signicant
at the 5% level for eight out of nine cases, and are all signicant at the 10% level (note that it is
an one-sided test). Thus our estimation results predict that the matching probability increases as
the market becomes thicker, consistent with the main prediction of our theoretical model. In other
words, a thicker market produces a better probability of matching. The statistically insignicant
estimates of 1 reﬂects the fact that the total number of supply in each eld, U,i sm e a s u r e dw i t h
error.2
Figure 3a gives the estimated curves using 2000 job market data, Figure 3b uses 2001 job
market data, and Figure 3c uses the pooled sample. These gures graph the observed and predicted
matching probabilities for models (11) and (12). Each point in these gures represents one eld.
The dotted line in each gure represents the predicted probability based on model (11); the solid
line plots the predicted probability based on model (12). The prediction is carried at the sample
mean of minfU=V;1g. Comparing model (11) with model (12) we observe that the nonlinear model
shows more pronounced thickness eects. Within the same model (say model (12)), all three graphs
are similar, reﬂecting the fact that estimates from dierent sample are similar. From all the graphs,
we clearly see that matching probability is an increasing and concave function of the thickness (d)
of the market.
To understand the magnitude of the eect of thickness on the matching probability, consider
model (12) where the number of candidates equals the number of job openings; we have that (when
U = V ) the matching probability is
d (M=V)=^ 0 +^ 1(1) + ^ 2=d^ 3;
where d =
p
2V (since U = V ). For U = V = 5, 10, and 50, and using the pooled sample estimation
2The total number of candidates in these 50 schools in each eld is our noisy measure of the total supply of the
market. One source of noise comes from the classication of candidates' elds. For example, students often indicate
their elds to be one of the thicker elds. In the two year period we have data, among the 126 elds that have
academic openings, only 45% of them have candidates, although 62% of those elds have some success to hire at least
one candidate.
20result, our empirical model predicts the matching probabilities of .361, .421, and .523, respectively.
Finally, in order to check whether elds such as \any eld" (AF) and \general economics" (A1)
contaminate our estimation results, we conduct estimates removing elds \AF" and \A1". These
two elds have large numbers of openings while there are no candidates labeled as \any eld" or
\general economics." Estimation results not reported here (they are available upon request) show
virtually identical parameters estimates as well as the goodness-of-t R2 for the results given in
Table 5. Thus the fact that there are zero candidates in the thick elds \AF" and \A1" does not
aect our estimation results nor the conclusions derived from them.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a matching model with the matching probability depending on the thick-
ness of a market. In our model, the minimum job requirements of rms and the productivities of
job applicants are randomly drawn from a common distribution. A rm employs a job applicant
only if the job applicant's productivity is higher than the minimum requirement. All rms prefer a
higher productivity applicant to a lower one, and all applicants prefer a higher minimum standard
rm to a lower one. In this hypothetical market, we show that the probabilities of matches in a
thin market dier signicantly from those in a thick market.
We also characterize the case where rms and applicants have dierent distributions, the case
where the number of openings does not equal the number of applicants, and the case where openings
and candidates arrive at the market sequentially. In all these cases, the matching probability still
increases with the thickness of the market. In addition, we propose a parsimonious matching
function which is fairly close to the (simulated) theoretical matching function.
The implications of our model are consistent with the liquidity literature in the nancial market
where more trading occurs in a thicker market than in a thinner market. We apply our matching
model to the U.S. academic market for junior PhD economists. Consistent with the prediction of
our model, a eld with more job openings and more candidates has a higher probability of matching.
In particular, according to our model, the matching probability increases from .361 for 5 candidates
and openings to .523 for 50 candidates and openings.
The model above can be extended in many directions, such as to the regular labor or housing
21Table 5: Regressions of Matching Probabilities
(U.S. Academic Market for New PhD Economists)
Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)
Job Market in January 2000
constant .284 .362 .847
(5.69) (6.67) (1.98)
minfU/V, 1g .208 .142 .020
(2.51) (1.75) (.237)
1=[(V2 +U 2)1=2] -.112 -.674
(-4.03) (-1.52)




R2 .250 .339 .466
#o fo b s e r v a t i o n s 6 1 6 1 6 1
Job Market in January 2001
constant .370 .456 .658
(8.29) (8.97) (3.36)
minfU/V, 1g -.023 -.094 -.155
(-.29) (-1.19) (-1.84)
1=[(V2 +U 2)1=2] -.212 -.468
(-4.78) (-2.20)




R2 .192 .273 .315
#o fo b s e r v a t i o n s 6 5 6 5 6 5
Pooled Sample of 2000 and 2001
constant .314 .398 .775
(9.43) (10.88) (3.36)
minfU/V, 1g .106 .035 -.068
(1.82) (.62) (-1.15)
1=[(V2 +U 2)1=2] -.139 -.591
(-5.97) (-2.45)




R2 .160 .266 .369
# of observations 126 126 126
* t-values are in parentheses.
22markets. It may require more serious eort to relax some assumptions made in this paper. For
example, job candidates may have dierent preference orderings of employers, as may employers.
More general transferable utility functions may be more appropriate for a general labor market
because one may enjoy a higher utility if he/she moves to a better quality rm. Buyers in the
housing market have several aspects to consider, while sellers may only care about the selling
prices.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: The joint distribution of (u(1);:::;u(U))a n d( v(1);:::;v(V ))a r e( U!)
QU
r=1 f(u(r))a n d( V !)
QV
r=1 f(v(r)),

































U+V −1(z(U+V ))F(z(U+V ))
=
(V !)(U!)
(U + V )!
:
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We know that An is independent of the distribution f. Therefore, without loss of generality we assume that
f is a uniform distribution in the unit interval. For any (small) >0, we choose m =[ 1 =] > 1=.( [ :]
denotes the integer part of :) and divide the unit interval into m intervals with equal length 1=m for each.
That is: [0;1] = [m
l=1Il,w h e r eIl =[ ( l − 1)=m;l=m)( l =1 ;:::;m,w i t hIm =[ ( m − 1)=m;1]). Let nu;l and
nv;l denote the number of observations from fuign
i=1 and fvign
i=1 that fall inside in interval Il (l =1 ;:::;m).
We know that on the average there are n=m observations from both fuign
i=1 and fvign
i=1 that fall inside
interval Il for all l =1 ;:::;m. In fact by the strong law of large number (Billingsley 1986(p.80)) we have
P(limn!1 ns;l=n =1 =m) = 1 for all l =1 ;:::;m (s = u;v).
23Note that the candidates with ui's fall inside the interval Il can match with any job opening with vj's
falls in Il−1 (l =2 ;:::;m). Given that with probability one that nu;l=n ! 1=m and nv;l−1=n ! 1=m,w ek n o w
that, with probability approaching to one as n !1 , that there can have n=m matches for u0
is 2 Il matching
with v0
is 2 Il−1. Sum over l from 2 to m we get, with probability one, that the number of matched candidates
is at least (since we ignore the possibility that u0
is 2 I1 may also nd match) nmatch=n  (m−1)=m  1−,




 1 − ) ! 1: (13)
Therefore we have











because for any 1 >>0, we can choose  = =2 and by (13), we have n−1 P
rn(1−) rP(r)  n−1n(1 −
)
P
r>n(1−) P(r)  (1 − )2  1 − .T h u s ,n−1 P
rn(1−) rP(r) ! 1a sn !1which implies An ! 1,
completing the proof of Lemma 2.
Let Pr(#  r) denote the probability that at least r people nd jobs. Then it is easy to see that
Pr(#  r)=P r ( u(n) >v (n−r+1);u (n−1) >v (n−r);:::;u(n−r) >v (2);u (n−r+1) >v (1)). The next lemma shows
that Pr(#  r) can be used to compute E(r).
Lemma 3: Let # denote the number of people who nd jobs (0  #  minfV;Ug), and denote by
Pr(#  r)=
Pn









rPr(r)=fPr(1) + (2)Pr(2) + ::: +( n)Pr(n)g





A.3 The case of n =3
Let u3 >u 2 >u 1 be the order statistic of candidates, and v3 >v 2 >v 1 be the order statistic of openings
(we omit the parentheses in the subscripts to simplify the notation).
Pr(0) = Pr(u3 <u 2 <u 1 <v 1 <v 2 <v 3)=( 3 ! ) 2(1=6!) = 1=20:
Pr(#  1) = 1 − Pr(0) = 19=20:
Pr(#  2) = Pr(u3 >v 2;u 2 >v 1)=P r ( u3 >v 2 >u 2 >v 1)+P r ( u3 >u 2 >v 2 >v 1)=1 4 =20
24since
Pr(u3 >v 2 >u 2 >v 1)=P r ( u3 >v 3 >v 2 >u 2 >v 1 >u 1)+P r ( v3 >u 3 >v 2 >u 2 >v 1 >u 1)
+P r ( u3 >v 3 >v 2 >u 2 >u 1 >v 1)+P r ( v3 >u 3 >v 2 >u 2 >u 1 >v 1)
=4 [ ( 3 ! ) =(6!)] = 4=20:
Pr(u3 >u 2 >v 2 >v 1)=P r ( u3 >u 2 >v 3 >v 2 >v 1 >u 1)+P r ( u3 >v 3 >u 2 >v 2 >v 1 >u 1)
+P r ( v3 >u 3 >u 2 >v 2 >v 1 >u 1)+P r ( u3 >u 2 >v 3 >v 2 >u 1 >v 1)
+P r ( u3 >v 3 >u 2 >v 2 >u 1 >v 1)+P r ( v3 >u 3 >u 2 >v 2 >u 1 >v 1)
+P r ( u3 >u 2 >v 3 >u 1 >v 2 >v 1)+P r ( u3 >v 3 >u 2 >u 1 >v 2 >v 1)
+P r ( v3 >u 3 >u 2 >u 1 >v 2 >v 1)+P r ( u3 >u 2 >u 1 >v 3 >v 2 >v 1)
= 10[(3!)=(6!)] = 10=20:
Pr(3) = Pr(u3 >v 3;u 2 >v 2;u 1 >v 1)
=P r ( u3 >v 3 >u 2 >v 2 >u 1 >v 1)+P r ( u3 >u 2 >v 3 >v 2 >u 1 >v 1)
+P r ( u3 >v 3 >u 2 >u 1 >v 2 >v 1)+P r ( u3 >u 2 >v 3 >u 1 >v 2 >v 1)
+P r ( u3 >u 2 >u 1 >v 3 >v 2 >v 1)
=5 f(3!)
2=(1=6!)g =5 =20:






Pr(#  r)=[ ( 1 9 =20)+ (14=20)+ (5=20)]=3=1 9 =30:
A.4 The case of n =4
Pr(0) = (4!)2=(8!) = 1=70 by Lemma 1. Pr(#  1) = 1 − P(0) = 69=70.
Pr(#  2) = [(3 + 6) + (3 + 6 + 10)+ (3 + 6 + 10 + 15)]=70 = 62=70.
Pr(#  3 )=[ ( 2+3 )+( 2+3+4 )+( 2+3+4+5 ) ] =70 = 42=70.






Pr(#  r)=[ ( 6 9 =70)+ (62=70)+ (42=70)+ (14=70)]=4 = 187=280:
A.5 The case of dierent means
We assume that sellers are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution in the unit interval (unif[0,1]), while
the buyers are random draws with a uniform distribution in the interval of [;1+]. We only consider the
25case of V = U = n.
For n = 1, straightforward calculation shows that A1 =P r ( 1 )=( 1 =2)(1 − )2.
For n = 2, a more tedious calculation shows that
Pr(0) = (1 + 4 +6 2 − 43 − 4)=6; andPr(2) = (1 − )4=3:
Hence (using Pr(1) = 1 − Pr(0) − Pr(2)),
A2 =( 1 =2)[Pr(1) + 2Pr(2)] = (7=12)(1 − )
2 +( 1 =12)(1 − )
2(2 + 3):
A.6 The case of V 6= U
Case (i) (U;V )=( 1 ;2) or (2;1)
Let v1 <v 2 be the order statistic of openings. By Lemma 1 we have
Pr(1) = Pr(v2 >u>v 1 or u>v 1;v 2)=P r ( v2 >u>v 1)+P r ( u>v 2 >u 1)=2 f1!2!=3!g =2 =3:
Therefore, MU;V = M1;2 =P r ( 1 )=2 =3. From this one can compute BU;V .
Case (ii) (U;V )=( 3 ;1) or (1;3)
Let v1 <v 2 <v 3 be the order statistic of openings.
Pr(0) = Pr(u<v 1;v 2;v 3)=P r ( u<v 1 <v 2 <v 3)=f1!3!=4!g =1 =4.
Pr(1) = 1 − Pr(0) = 3=4. Therefore, M1;3 =P r ( 1 )=3 =4. Then one can compute BU;V .
Case (iii) (U;V )=( 2 ;4) or (4;2)
Let u1 <u 2 and v1 <v 2 <v 3 <v 4 be the order statistics of candidates and openings, respectively.
Pr(0) = Pr(u2 <v 2)=Pr(u1 <u 2 <v 1 <v 2 <v 3 <v 4)=f2!4!=6!g =1 =15.
Pr(1) = Pr(v1 <u 1 <u 2 <v 2)+P r ( v1 <u 1 <v 2)=1 =15 + 4=15 = 1=3.
Pr(2) = 1 − Pr(0) − Pr(1) = 3=5. Hence, M2;4 =1 =3+2 ( 3 =5) = 23=15.
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Figure 2 Matching Probabilities
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